Article Review of Traditional Ethics and the Moral Status of Animals by White, James E.
14 E&A VII 
Alastair S. Gunn, "Traditional Ethics and the Moral of
Status  
Animals", Environmental Ethics, Vol. 5, No.2,
 
Summer, 1983, pp. 133-153.
 
Gunn argues that environmental 
problems (including the moral status 
of nonhuman animals) cannot be solved 
by either utilitarianism or rights of 
theory; instead he recommends a 
theory of h uma n stewa rds hip to solve 
these problems. 
The numerous criticisms Gunn 
makes of utilitarianism, however, do 
not add· up to a decisive refutation, 
and none of them shows that utilita­
rianism is of no use in solving envi­
ronmental problems, or deciding the 
moral status of animals. He claims, to 
begin with, that utilitarianism "is 
unable to ascribe value to nonsentient 
beings." (p. 135) But utilitarianism 
as a theory about the right can be 
distinguished from theories about the 
good (such as hedonism) which 
ascribe intrinsic value only to sentient 
beings. Even though classical utilita­
rians such as Bentham were also 
hedonists, it is not logically necessary 
. to saddle utilitarianism with hedonism 
or any other sentient-centric view of 
intrinsic value. It is possible for a 
uti Iita rian to ascribe val ue to nonsen­
tient beings. Fu rthermore, even if 
utilitarianism is formulated in such a 
way that on Iy sentient bei ngs can 
have value, as Singer does following 
Bentham, it does not follow that such 
a theory has no usefu I application to 
moral problems about the environment 
or nonhuman animals. The natural 
envi ronment wou Id still have instru­
mental value because it satisfies inter­
ests, and this would provide a good 
reason for preserving it. And animals 
would definitely have a moral status, 
as Singer has shown. Gunn does 
mention Singer's utilitarian approach 
to animals, and surprisingly enough, 
he seems to agree with it except for a 
couple of . reservations. He says, "I 
believe that utilita rian ism can present 
a good case for ceasing to exploit 
captive animals." (p. 140) So it 
looks like utilitarianism does establish 
something important about the moral 
status of animals after all, namely that 
it is morally wrong to exploit captive 
animals. 
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As it turns out, Gunn's main 
complaint about utilitarianism is not 
that it leaves animals with no moral 
status, but rather that it does not 
provide us with a satisfactory envi­
ronmental ethic. The reason is that 
developers could use it to defend the 
destruction of natu ra I ecosystems; for 
example, defenders of the B. Everett 
Jordan Dam in North Carolina have 
claimed that it would provide benefits 
to humans and animals that would out­
weigh the harm done to the environ­
ment and a few wild turkey and deer. 
Gunn is right about this: utilita­
rianism can be used to justify the 
destruction of some natu ral ecosys­
tems. But does this mean that utili­
tarianism must be rejected as an ethi­
cal theory? If this destruction really 
does benefit both humans and animals, 
if it satisfies importa nt sentient inter­
ests, and not just trivial desires, why 
then it would be morally justifiable. 
At least this does not conflict with my 
moral intuitions. . It is environmental 
fanaticism to insist that every and all 
natu ral ecosystems shou Id be pre­
served even where this provides no 
benefit to sentient beings and even 
harms them. I do not see, then, that 
Gunn has given us any good reasons 
for rejecting utilitarianism as a moral 
theory about an imals and the envi ron­
ment. 
As for rights theory, Gu nn dis­
cusses the view that nonhuman animals 
have a right to life and a right not to 
be made to suffer, where these are 
held by individual animals (not whole 
species or ecosystems), and are 
largely negative rights requiring us 
not to interfere. He makes two main 
objections: (1) Moral rights require 
reciprocity: a person cannot have 
rights without also having duties; but 
animals do not have duties, and so 
they cannot have rights. (2) It is 
impossible to base an envi ronmental 
ethic on individual rights. 
Neither of these objections is 
convi nci ng. There a re plenty of 
cases where a being can have a right 
and not have duties, e.g., fetuses, 
infants, the retarded, the senile, the· 
sick, and so on. If these humans 
have rights without duties, then why 
can't animals have similar rights? 
Gunn's reply is that persons cannot 
have civil rights such as the right to 
vote without having duties. But this 
is just bes ide the poi nt; the rights at 
issue are basic rights such as the 
right to life and the right not to suf­
fer, and not civil rights. Even if 
animals and marginal humans do not 
have civil rights, they can still have 
basic rights. 
Another difficulty for Gunn' s view 
is the fact that animals seem to be 
capable of acting as moral agents, and 
this suggests that they could have 
duties and be members of the moral 
community. Rhesus mon keys, for 
example, exhibit compassion, and this 
means that they are capable of moral 
goodness, even if they are unable to 
form an intellectual concept of right 
and wrong. 
The second objection is puzzling. 
Gunn claims that even if individual 
animals and trees have rights (that 
is, basic rights such as the right not 
to be injured or damaged), we would 
still have no reason for preserving 
whole species or whole ecosystems 
because these collections do not have 
rights, only individuals do. What 
puzzles me is how one could save 
individual animals or trees and not 
save species and forests as a result. 
Maybe a species is not merely a col­
lection of individual animals, but still 
if one preserves the individual animals 
and allows them to reproduce, this 
will result in the species being pre­
served too. 
Finally, let us turn to Gunn's own 
view of stewardship. This amounts to 
little more than the traditional 
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Christian view. (Non-Christians are 
told that they should act as if they 
were God's stewards.) According to 
this familiar homocentric doctrine, 
human beings are superior to all other 
creatu res and have a God-given 
responsibility to rule over God's cre­-
ation in His place, that is, humans 
are supposed to act as stewards or 
trustees for God, taking care of His 
creation for Him. But since God's 
creation is good (Gunn emphasizes 
this at more than one place) all we 
need to do is leave it alone. This 
duty, Gunn says, can be inferred 
from the Bible: "The Bible is not 
ver'y specific about this, but certainly 
the deliberate (or careless) extermina­-
tion of species, the poisoning of 
lakes, rivers, and air, the destruction 
of soil fertility and land stability seem 
quite incompatible with a recognition 
of our stewardship over God's cre­-
ation." (p. 152) 
But why don't we have a positive 
duty to reduce suffering of animals 
(and humans) or to protect their 
rights? Gunn's answer is quite 
clear--this is not part of God's plan. 
He says that God's plan is "certainly 
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not designed to reduce suffering or to 
protect rights. " (p. 152) So we 
ought to do nothing to reduce animal 
suffering-- "Mostly we should leave 
them alone." (p. 150) 
It is obvious to me that this 
approach to suffering is morally 
objectionable. It would mean that we 
shouldn't feed domestic animals and 
pets, we shouldn't treat their infec­-
tions and diseases, we shouldn't pro­-
vide them with shelter, we shouldn't 
set broken limbs, we shouldn't kill 
injured animals, and so on. And what 
about humans? Does this mean that 
we shouldn't treat human diseases, 
that we should make no attempt to 
reduce human s'uffering, since this 
suffering is part of God's plan? No 
doubt there are fundamentalist Chris­-
tians who do not go to doctors or 
seek medical help, who expect to be 
healed by God or die, but this is 
hardly a reasonable view to take, 
either for humans or animals. If this 
is what the Christian view comes to, 
and it does seem to come to this on 
Gu nn 's view, then humans and an imals 
are much better off with utilitarianism 
or rights theory. 
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